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"A PIG'S BREAKFAST"': JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING
FOR SCIENTIFIC AND SPECIALIZED EXPERT
TESTIMONY
Jane Doe wanted to lose thirty poundsfor her wedding. Sadly, instead of a wedding celebration, Jane's family arrangedfor her funeral
after she died from heart complications allegedly caused by the newly
marketed diet drug she was taking. Jane'sfamily hires you to handle their
wrongful death suit against the makers of the diet drug.2 To win your
case, you must find an expert to testify that the diet drug caused Jane's
untimely demise. What standards will the judge use in evaluating the admissibility of your expert's testimony? What steps can you take to ensure
that the jury will hear the testimony?
I. INTRODUCTION
Expert testimony is often an essential tool for determining a party's
liability, or lack thereof, in a particular case. 3 A judge must determine
whether expert testimony is admissible before allowing it in front of a jury,
due to its inherent persuasiveness and potential to mislead.4 Attorneys
1 James L. Dam, "Expert Testimony Is Harder To Use: U.S. Supreme Court," 99
Law. Wkly US 312, 20 (Apr. 5, 1999) (asserting Supreme Court "made a pig's breakfast"
of guidelines for expert testimony in Kumho Tire).
2 See Judge Rules Expert's Conclusions on Diet Drug as Too Speculative, Boston
Herald, January 6, 2000 (discussing lawsuit filed against Fisons Corporation, makers of diet
drug phentermine).
3 See FED. R.

EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (asserting intelligent application
of facts often impossible without expert testimony); see also Kurtis B. Reeg and Cawood
K. Bebout, What's ItAll About, Daubert? 53 J. Mo. B. 369, 377 (1997).
4 See FED. R. EvID. 104(a) which states, in pertinent part: "Preliminary questions
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court..."; see also FED. R. EVID. 401
(evidence must be relevant); FED. R. EvID. 702 (admissibility of expert testimony); FED. R.
EVID. 703 (basis of opinion); FED. R. EVID. 403 (exclusion of relevant evidence based on
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continue to grapple with anticipating the appropriate standards for admitting scientific and technical expert testimony, due in part to the wide discretion afforded to judges as gatekeepers by the Federal Rules of Evidence
and the Supreme Court.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals6 the Supreme Court
provided judges with more flexibility in their role as gatekeepers by ruling
that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the rigid "general acceptance test" for admitting scientific expert testimony.7 The Court recently
held that the guidelines for admitting scientific expert testimony set out in
Daubert might also apply to other specialized or technical knowledge. 8
Part II of this note traces the legal developments surrounding expert testimony, including an outline of the Daubert guidelines trial judges use to
ensure that such evidence is both reliable and relevant. 9 Part III reviews
the arguments in favor of extending Daubert to other specialized knowledge, while Part IV examines the arguments against such an extension.
Finally, Part V asserts that the Court's extension of the Daubert guidelines
to other specialized knowledge is consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence and a practical response to the inevitable intermingling of scientific
and other specialized expert testimony.
II. HISTORY OF LAW OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

A. FederalLaw of Expert Testimony
For nearly fifty years under Federal law, the courts admitted scientific evidence at trial if it was generally accepted in the testifying expert's
field.10 This general acceptance test, established in Frye v. United States,
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time).
5 See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(reasoning difficulty of task does not excuse judges from gatekeeping responsibility).
6509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7 See id. at 589; see also Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47 (1925) (ex-

plaining testimony must have gained general acceptance in field before admission).
8 See Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 146 (1999) (asserting some
cases may not require use of Daubert screening test).
9 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-95 (holding relevance and reliability as measuring
standard for expert testimony).
10See Frve, 54 App. D.C. at 47:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
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was a rigid standard that limited judicial discretion in evaluating the merits
of expert testimony." The Federal Rules of Evidence ("Federal Rules"),
enacted in 1975, established a different standard for determining the relevancy and admissibility of expert evidence.12 The Federal Rules state that
relevant testimony from qualified experts is admissible if it will assist the
trier of fact in resolving a disputed issue.' 3 The Federal Rules have a "liberal thrust" that contrasted with the rigid, common-law based general acceptance test, and sparked division over which standard should apply to

expert testimony. 14
The Supreme Court resolved part of the issue in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, signaling the next major legal development involving expert testimony. 15 In Daubert, the Court held that the general
acceptance test was incompatible with, and superseded by, the Federal
Rules.16 The Court further held that, before admitting scientific expert tesexperimental and the demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
11See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (stating general acceptance standard rigid); see also
James Hanson, Frye is Sixty-Five Years Old; Should He Retire?, 16 West. St. U. L. Rev.
357 (1989)(asserting standard should be modified).
12 See FED. R. EvID. 401 (providing relevant evidence is that which makes the determination of fact more probable or less probable than without it); FED. R. EvID. 402
(stating all evidence admissible unless otherwise in Constitution, Acts of Congress or other
rules); FED. R. EVID. 403 (excluding prejudicial evidence). The Supreme Court asserted
that these rules should be read in harmony with the guidelines or admissibility of evidence
as established in Daubert.See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-91.
13See FED. R. EvID. 702: "If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id. In Daubert and Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court addressed new controversies involving which evidentiary standard governed
in cases with expert testimony. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 137.
'4 See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 163, 169 (1988) (discussing
division
over standards for admitting expert testimony).
15 See supra note 6 (presenting additional guidelines for admissibility of expert testimony).
16

See id. Daubert involved a suit by the parents of minor children born with defects

allegedly caused by the drug Benedictin that the mothers took while pregnant. Id. The
plaintiffs offered expert testimony based on animal studies, similar chemical studies and
reanalysis of published human statistical studies to show that the drug caused the defects.
The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the scientific evidence was inadmissible because it was not generally accepted in the community. The Court stated that
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timony, trial judges must determine whether an expert proposes to testify
as to scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact. 17 The Court then
presented guidelines intended to assist judges in their roles as gatekeepers
determining the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. These guidelines include: (1) whether the scientific theory can be or has been tested;
(2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the
known or potential rate of error; and (4) acceptance and support from the
relevant community. 18 Thus, the Supreme Court in Daubert not only afforded trial judges more flexibility, but also increased responsibility in
their roles as gatekeepers.1 9 Finally, the Court established that rulings on
admissibility could only be overturned if the trial judge abused his or her
discretion in reaching his or her determination.2 °
general acceptance was not an "absolute prerequisite" to admissibility, and that the flexible
standard adopted by Federal Rule 702 should be applied in all federal cases. Id. at 589.
Although the Supreme Court decisions in Daubert and Kumho Tire apply to all federal cases, many states have adopted them expressly or in practice. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court has adopted Daubert and Kumho. See Am. Computer Innovators,
Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17484 at *93 (D. Mass. Nov.
8, 1999) (accepting Kumho as extension of Daubert);see also Commonwealth v. Lanigan,
419 Mass. 15, 21, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1348 (1994) (accepting Daubert's reasoning as consistent with test for reliability).
17 See supra note 13 (discussing Federal Rule 702's failure to
mention general acceptance regarding expert testimony). The Court read FRE 702 as comprising a reliability
requirement, namely that the expert's testimony "derive from the scientific method" and be
validated by "good grounds." Id. According to the Court, 702 also contained a relevancy
requirement; that the evidence sufficiently "fit" the case in order to assist the jury in its
deliberations. Id.; see also Reeg and Bebout, 53 J. Mo. B. at 370. The Court asserted that
the reliability of an expert's testimony should be measured by whether both the theory and
the methodology used in reaching the conclusion were reliable. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at
593. Although the Court acknowledged that Rule 702 applies to "technical and other specialized knowledge," it limited its findings to scientific testimony. Id.
, See id. at 593-95. The Court did not intend the list to be exhaustive, as it recognized that judges could consider various factors for admissibility in a particular case. Id. at
593.
19See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 (stating federal judges possess capacity to make preliminary review of evidence on facts). Chief Justice Rhenquist expressed the concern echoed by the opponents of the flexible review in his dissent which states, in relevant part: "I
do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony. But I do not think it imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to
perform that role." Id. at 600.
20 See Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 143 (asserting abuse of discretion
standard rather
than more "stringent review" appropriate). A recent Supreme Court case established that if
appellate courts reverse trial court determinations of admissibility, they may enter judgment
for the party who lost at trial. See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
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Although Daubert proposed illustrative guidelines for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony, courts remained divided about
whether to apply Daubertto other specialized knowledge. 21 The Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether the Daubert guidelines applied beyond the "hard sciences" in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.22 In that case,
a plaintiff's tire blew out, resulting in an accident which injured one of his
passengers and killed another.2 3 The plaintiffs sued the Kumho Tire Co.,
manufacturers of the tire, claiming that the tire was defective and caused
the accident. 24 To bolster their case, the plaintiffs submitted testimony
from an expert analyst of tire failure who claimed that a defective separation in the tire caused it to rupture.25 Although the trial court used the
Daubert analysis in concluding that the expert's methodology was unreliable, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision on
grounds that the Daubert factors did not apply to non-scientific expert
testimony.26
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, asserting that
the reliability standard outlined in Daubert for scientific knowledge applied equally to technical or other specialized knowledge.27 In a carefully
21

See Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 285 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Mi-

chael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence, p. 25-26 (Supp. 1998)) (Daubert's gatekeeping language should apply to scientific evidence only); Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996) (inapplicable if not "hard science" testimony);
United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Daubert applies
only to scientific expert testimony); accord Kay v. First Cont'l Trading, Inc., 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14908 *1 (N.D.ll. 1997). But see Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc. 121 F.3d 984, 991
(5th Cir. 1997) (applies to scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge); Tyus v.
Urban Search Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (applies to expert in advertising).
22 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
23

See id. at 141.

24

See id.

25See id. at 142 (discussing expert analysis). Upon inspection the expert noted the

treads on the tire were worn to almost nothing, and that holes in the tire had been inadequately repaired. He concluded that the separation between the rubber and the steel "carcass" was the result of manufacturer defect, absent other signs of tire misuse. The factors
the expert used in reaching his conclusion included: (1) tread wear on the outside of the tire
which is greater than in the center; (2) indications of "bead groove" where the tire beads
have been pushed too hard against the rim; (3) tire discoloration or other signs of deterioration; and (4) marks on the outside rim. Id. Since the expert did not observe significant
signs of at least two indications of tire misuse, he concluded the tire was defective. id.
26 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153 (reversing Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that
Daubertapplied only to scientific testimony, not "skill or experience based testimony").
27See id. The Court stated that the language of Rule 702 "makes no relevant distinction between scientific knowledge and technical or other specialized knowledge." Id. at
158. The Court further asserted that not only would it be difficult for judges to make evi-
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worded opinion, the Court stated that Daubert factors such as rate of error,
general acceptance and submission to peer review might also apply to nonscientific testimony, depending on the circumstances.28 The Court noted
that the trial court should have the same flexibility in determining which, if
any, Daubert guidelines apply to a case as it does in concluding whether
an expert's testimony is relevant and reliable.29 While persuasive authority
in state courts, the Supreme Court decisions in Daubert and Kumho Tire
are only binding in federal cases.3 °
B.

MassachusettsLaw Regarding Expert Testimony

Massachusetts has adopted the Supreme Court decisions in Daubert
and Kumho Tire.31 Prior to Daubert,Massachusetts used the general acceptance test as the standard for admissibility of expert testimony. 32 Massachusetts courts held that the general acceptance test had a "practical usefulness" as an effective means of assuring that an expert's theory was reliable. 33 Massachusetts' Proposed Rule of Evidence regarding expert testimony, which is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ("Federal Rule
702"), laid the groundwork for judicial review of the then existing standards for expert testimony. dentiary determinations under a system which required them to distinguish between scientific and other specialized knowledge, but that there was "no convincing need" to make
such determinations. id. ("experts of all kinds tie observations to conclusions through the
use of specialized experience").
28See id. ("We can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the
applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert...") The Court underscored the fact that the
Daubert guidelines were not exhaustive, but merely illustrative. Id.
29See id. at 164 (suggesting trial court should consider the Daubert factors when
they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony in specific case).
30See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
31

See Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 24 (suggesting Daubert guidelines useful to all types of

expert testimony).
32See Commonwealth v. Cumin, 409 Mass. 218, 223, 565 N.E.2d 440, 444 (1991)
(holding testimony admissible under Frye standard).
33See generally Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 24 (asserting general acceptance test remains
strong indicator for admissibility); see also Theresa Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. 304, 313
(2000) (holding Daubert analysis applies to any expert witness). The Canavan case also
established that an appellate court could only overturn a trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony if there was an abuse of discretion. Id
34 See PROP. MASS. R. EvID. 702: "[ijf scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise" quoted in Rotman v. Natl

20011

JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING AND EXPERT TESTIMONY

27

Despite the general acceptance test's benefits, the Supreme Judicial
Court ("SJC") eventually recognized the possibility that a strict application
of the test might result in the exclusion of reliable evidence, and in Commonwealth v. Lanigan,35 adopted the Supreme Court's holding in
Daubert. 36 Thus, the SJC established that general acceptance was no
longer the exclusive standard for determining the admissibility of scientific
expert testimony in Massachusetts. 37 The SJC noted, however, that general acceptance within the scientific community would "continue to be the

significant, and often the only, issue" bearing on admissibility.38 Finally,
the SJC recognized that reviewing courts must accord great deference to a
trial judge's decision to admit or bar testimony based upon its relevance
and reliability.39
Even before the Supreme Court decision in Kumho Tire, Massachusetts applied the Daubert guidelines to other types of expert
testimony. 40 In Commonwealth v. Santoli,4 1 the SJC evaluated the admissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification. 42 In Santoli, a woman was raped in an alley behind a liquor store.43 The victim
noted her attacker's face, build, clothing and height, and later identified
him while she sat in a police cruiser. 44 The defendant sought to introduce
R.R. Passenger Corp., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 318, 669 N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (1996).
35 See supra at note 31.
36

See id.

37 The defendant in Lanigan was convicted of rape. He argued that expert testimony

based upon test results using the "ceiling principle" which showed a match between his
DNA and that of one of the victims should be excluded because the ceiling principle was
not one which was "generally accepted within the scientific community". Applying the
Daubert factors, the SJC admitted the testimony. Id. Massachusetts courts have used the
Daubert factors to exclude scientific testimony. See Aziz v. French, No. 98-1749, 1999
Mass. Super. LEXIS 233, at *5-6 (Jun. 1, 1999) (physician's letter on causation excluded in
personal injury trial due to lack of reliable methodology); Rotman, 41 Mass. App. Ct. at
318 (expert testimony that crash aggravated plaintiffs existing medical condition excluded
based on technology used).
38 Id.
39 See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 413 Mass. 598, 604, 602 N.E.2d 555, 610 (1992)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 410 Mass. 199, 202, 571 N.E.2d 623, 626 (1991))
(stating judge's discretionary ruling on admissibility only reversed if abuse of discretion or
error of law).
40
See Commonwealth v. Santoli, 424 Mass. 837, 843, 680 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (1997)

(using Daubert guidelines to evaluate expert testimony on eyewitness identification).
4' See id. at 838.
42 See

id.

43 See id.
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expert testimony that victims under a high amount of stress are less able to
recognize their attacker's physical characteristics.4 5
The SJC held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in barring the testimony as unhelpful to the jury under Proposed Mass. R. Evid.
702. 46 The Court also cited Daubert, and discussed guidelines for determining the admissibility of expert opinions on eyewitness identification
such as: (1) the opinion must be relevant to the circumstances of the witness' identification; (2) the subject of the opinion must be one on which
the jurors need assistance and can be helped; and (3) the jury will not be
misled by the testimony.47 Massachusetts has also extended the Daubert
analysis 48to expert testimony in cases involving murder, robbery and drug
dealing.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR EXTENDING DAUBERTTO TECHNICAL OR
SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE

A. FederalRule 702 Does Not Distinguish Between "Scientific" or "other
Specialized Knowledge"
Proponents of extending the Daubert screening test to other spe44 See id. at 840. The victim identified the items her attacker was wearing (a Bruins

hat and black jacket) and carrying (a black bag). The police drove her around the shopping
mall, where she spotted the defendant walking along the sidewalk. She then identified the
defendant by saying "[t]hat's him." Id.
41 See id.
46 See Santoli, 424 Mass. at 843 (proffered expert testimony within general realm of
juror's knowledge).
47 See id. The Court also asserted that the opinion must be "sufficiently tied to the
facts of the case so that it will aid the jury in resolving the matter." Id.
48 See Commonwealth v. Ashley, 427 Mass. 620, 624, 694 N.E.2d 862, 865 (1998).
In that case, the Court upheld the trial judge's determination that expert testimony involving
the identification of a murder suspect would not assist the jury, when the jury heard other
evidence linking the defendant to the murder. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Pagano, 47
Mass. App. Ct. 55, 64, 710 N.E.2d 1034, 1042 (1999) (robbery) (excluding expert testimony on unreliability of victim's voice identification of defendant); (drugs) Commonwealth
v. Cordero, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 923, 924, 614 N.E.2d 1000 (1993) (ruling "knowledge as to
significance and method of packaging, amount and purity of narcotics, and different instrumentalities used to administer narcotics as they relate to.. .possession with intent to
distribute is not within the realm of common experience"); Johnson, 413 Mass. at 603
(allowing police officer to testify as expert that defendant's packaging of cocaine indicated
his intent to distribute).
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cialized knowledge assert that by making no distinction between "scientific" or "other specialized knowledge," Federal Rule 702 sets up a "standard of evidentiary reliability" which applies to all expert testimony. 49
Therefore, the trial judge may use the Daubert factors to determine
whether proffered expert testimony in any field is both relevant and supported by sound methodology. 50 Proponents also argue that a broad interpretation of Federal Rule 702 is consistent with the rationale behind placing judges in the role of gatekeeper for expert testimony; namely, tempering the wide latitude given to expert witnesses, such as their ability to give
testimony which is not based on their firsthand knowledge. 5'
B. Difficult to DistinguishBetween "Scientific" or "Other Specialized
Knowledge"
Proponents also argue that since many professions use both scientific and specialized knowledge to create a product or achieve a result,
scientific and other knowledge are often intertwined. 52 They assert that
judges would be unable to serve effectively as gatekeepers if they had to
determine whether the testimony was founded upon science or other types
of knowledge.5 3 Furthermore, since all experts reach their conclusions
based on professional experiences which are unlike the jury's, according to
advocates, there is no need for the judge to distinguish between the types
of knowledge used. 54 Accordingly, the judge's job is to ensure that expert
testimony is reliable, relevant, and helpful to the jury regardless of whether
it is based on scientific or other specialized knowledge.55
49 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 156 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).
50

See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 164.
51See id. ("[Tihe evidentiary rationale that underlay the court's basic "gatekeeping"

determination is not limited to 'scientific knowledge'...the Rules grant (testimonial) latitude
to all experts, not just to scientific ones"); see also FED. R. EVID. 703 (expert opinion may
be based upon information received at or before hearing, no requirement of firsthand
knowledge).
52 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 165 (no clear line that divides scientific knowledge
from others). The Court cited engineering to illustrate its point. Engineering requires scientific knowledge such as physics, and a scientific experiment relies on "properly engineered
machinery" to reach a valid conclusion. Id.
53 See id.; see also Judge Harvey Brown, "Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses" 36
Hous. L. Rev. 743, 803 (1999) ("Limiting Daubert to scientific evidence would require
courts to add a new dimension to their analysis by artificially trying to define what constitutes science").
54 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158.
55 See Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola, 161 F.3d 77, 88 (1st Cir. 1998) (explaining reli-
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C. Extending Daubert Assists Juries in UnderstandingComplex
Specialized Expert Testimony
Attorneys can effectively challenge the accuracy of scientific evidence on cross examination by showing flaws in methodology, contradictions between the expert's conclusions and those reached by the scientific
community, and a lack of scientific foundation.56 Proponents suggest that
since non-scientific specialized knowledge is based on professional experience, something that is harder to quantify objectively, such knowledge is
difficult to challenge through traditional cross-examination.
Therefore,
judges must carefully screen specialized testimony for reliability and rele58
vance, as juries will be less able to evaluate such testimony on their own.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EXTENDING DAUBERTTO
TECHNICAL OR SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE

A. Extension Creates Undue Hardshipfor Plaintiffs and May Assist
CriminalDefendants.
Once the opposing side has challenged expert testimony, it is sub59
jected to the judge's screening test in a preliminary "Daubert-hearing."
Opponents of extending the screening test to non-scientific testimony as6
sert that it will place an undue burden on plaintiffs in a number of ways. 0
First, the Kumho Tire decision gives defense attorneys an incentive to
challenge all experts before trial, increasing money and time spent litigating the merits of expert testimony in pretrial hearings. 6 ' Second, evidence
that was once admitted under the general acceptance standard now risks
62
exclusion under the increased scrutiny of the Daubert screening test.
ability and relevance are legal judgments which are judge's responsibility despite complex
evidence).
56 See Brown, supra note 53.
57See id.
58 See

id.

59See Reeg and Bebout: What's It All About, Daubert?, 53 J. Mo. B. 369 at 371 (describing pre-trial Dauberthearing).
60See supranote I and accompanying text.
61See id.

62See id. (forensic sciences such as handwriting analysis, hair comparisons and
voiceprints open to attack as "unreliable").
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Finally, prosecutors express concern that increased challenges to experts
might assist criminal defendants, since judges have raised the standard of
admissibility for certain evidence such as sobriety tests and psychological
evaluations.63
B. Judges Are Neither Scientists Nor Specialists
By establishing trial judges as gatekeepers for all types of expert
testimony, the Supreme Court requires them to digest and evaluate complex scientific and technical evidence for its "fit" in the case. 64 Opponents
assert that since most judges are not well versed in the technologies or
theories offered by proposed experts, there is a danger that evidence will
be misunderstood and excluded as "unreliable. '65 Some critics also argue
that Kumho Tire blurred Daubert's emphasis on deliberating an expert's
methodology and conclusions to determine reliability, thus allowing
judges to make decisions based on subjective criteria.66 These opponents
predict that the standards established by Daubert and Kumho Tire will
result in the exclusion
of helpful testimony, impairing the jury's ability to
67
find the truth.
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's extension of the Daubert factors to technical
or specialized knowledge is an appropriate response to the need for judges
to evaluate all expert testimony before allowing its admission before a
jury.68 Many types of specialized knowledge are founded upon unique
professional experiences and opinions. Without Daubertand Kumho Tire,
a judge could subject the jury to a wide array of theories and conclusions,
based on foundations that are difficult to scrutinize, by allowing such testimony into evidence under the "general acceptance test. "69
63

See id.

64See Ruiz-Troche, 161 F.3d at 81 ("choreographing the Daubert pavane remains an

exceedingly difficult task").
65 See supra note 60 (suggesting judges use the extension of Daubert factors to
"clear their calendars" by excluding exceedingly complicated evidence).
66 See supra note 50.
67See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 ("a gatekeeping role for the judge...inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning authentic insights and innovations...").
68See id. (asserting increased scrutiny results in higher quality of expert testimony).
69See generally William C. Smith, No Escape From Science, A.B.A J.,
Aug. 2000 at
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Requiring judges to review the methodology all experts use in
reaching their conclusions increases the likelihood that the jury will hear
reliable expert testimony. 70 For instance, in a case involving a house fire,
an electrician may testify that, due to its high potential for causing fires, a
certain type of wiring is generally acknowledged to be inappropriate for
use in new homes. If that same expert were allowed to testify under the old
general acceptance test, and on merely an educated hunch concluded that
the wiring was the cause of the particular fire, the jury alone would have to
assess both the relevance and the reliability of his testimony. 71 Although
opposing counsel could cross-examine the electrician, counsel would have
fewer resources available to place against expert's conclusions.72
Under Kumho Tire the trial judge will review the testimony to determine whether the methodology the electrician used in reaching his conclusions was reliable and relevant to the particular case.73 Was the wiring
defective? Were there any other hazards in this case that were more likely
to have caused the fire? Did the electrician use methods in reaching his
conclusions that are accepted amongst other electricians? Finally, what
are the potential rates of error for the electrician's techniques? If the evidence passes this preliminary analysis, the jury is more likely to hear useful testimony.
Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult for fact finders to ascertain the
difference between scientific and nonscientific evidence.74 For instance,
criminal investigators use both DNA evidence and specialized investigative techniques to form their cases and builders use physics concepts like
gravity, weight and pressure when completing projects.75 Science and
professional experience thus combine equally to assist investigators, builders and other professionals in reaching informed conclusions. Requiring a
judge to make a distinction between what is scientific and what is not for
61 (suggesting rigorous standard for expert testimony makes lawyers more thorough regarding experts).
70 See id. (asserting before Daubert and Kumho judges would "nod off' and not
question experts).
71See id ("[an educated guess or significant hunch is not enough.. (attorneys) now
need good science").
72 Scott Bales, "Turning the Microscope Back on Forensic Scientists," LITIG., vol. 6
No. 2 (Winter 2000).
73 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 165 (holding Daubert analysis applies equally to scientific and technical knowledge).
74 See id. (stating no clear line that divides scientific knowledge from others).
75 See supra note 67 (asserting all types of cases might be subject to scientific or
technical expert testimony).
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purposes of admitting each expert's testimony will result in
76 increased confusion, lack of uniformity and backlog at the pretrial level.
Furthermore, Daubert and its progeny allow judges to be flexible
when evaluating expert testimony.77 The guidelines are merely illustrative,
and are not applicable to every case.78 Neither Kumho Tire nor Daubert
completely abolishes general acceptance as a standard of reliability.7 9 In
fact, general acceptance remains an important guideline for judges to use
when evaluating expert testimony. 80 In many cases, especially those involving clearly scientific evidence, general acceptance will be a crucial
factor in the judge's decision to admit the testimony.'
Extending the Daubert factors to all expert testimony also gives
judges the proper tools to evaluate testimony based on modern
technology. New professions and disciplines have emerged as a result of
rapid advances in technology. 83 Internet start-ups require web-site consultants, and on-line media specialists. Law firms and banks have expanded information technology departments, or hired outside consultants
to provide ongoing support and maintenance of company-wide computer
networks. With each new profession comes a new "community" of experts. It would be difficult for courts to determine whether an expert's
testimony is admissible based solely on standards that are generally accepted in these new communities, since the standards are constantly
evolving and changing. 84 Allowing judges to be flexible in evaluating
testimony based on new technology is an effective protection against presenting the jury with unreliable information.
In Massachusetts, extending the Daubert guidelines to expert testimony in criminal cases has not resulted in an increased benefit to criminals.85 In fact, trial judges acting as gatekeepers have prevented expert
76

Id

77 See Daubert,509 U.S. at 586 (providing judges have wide discretion in choosing

to admit expert testimony).
78 See id. (suggesting factors are not mandatory, and may vary depending on circumstances).
79 See Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 24 (asserting general acceptance test remains strong in-

dicator for admissibility).
80See id.
81 See id.
82

See supra note 69 (stating advances in computer and biotechnology introduce new

legal issues).
83

Id

84 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
85 Id.
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testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness and voice identification, presumably intended to help the defendant, because such testimony
did not meet the Daubert standards of relevance and reliability. 86 Incidentally, the SJC has also concluded that police officers may testify as experts
regarding the packaging of drugs found on defendants as an indication of
their intent to distribute narcotics. 87 Such rulings indicate that criminal
defendants will have a more difficult time building a defense around traditionally "defense friendly" testimony.
While many attorneys argue that Daubert and Kumho Tire will result in increased pre-trial costs, practitioners should remember that judges
may appoint neutral experts to assist them in pre-trial challenges. 88 Of
course, attorneys should also research and seek experts who are not only
experienced in their field, but are able to employ a sound and reliable
methodology (scientific or otherwise) in reaching their conclusions.89
VI. CONCLUSION
Both the SJC and the Supreme Court have established that all expert testimony must meet the standards of relevancy and reliability outlined in Daubert. In many cases, whether or not the testimony is generally
accepted within the community will be an essential factor in determining
its admissibility. However, allowing judges flexibility as gatekeepers over
all expert testimony ensures that the jury will not hear misleading evidence. While courts will inevitably exclude some helpful testimony due to
Daubert's extension to technical or other specialized knowledge, requiring
such judicial screening is especially important given the growing community of technological experts, whose testimony has the potential to confuse
the jury.
The argument that Kumho Tire will work to assist criminal defendants is not reflected in Massachusetts' decisions. These decisions suggest
that courts will exclude traditionally favorable defense expert testimony on
matters such as victim identification. Finally, any potential hardship to
86 See Santoli, 424 Mass. at 843 (using Daubert guidelines to evaluate expert testimony on eyewitness identification).
87 See Johnson, 413 Mass. at 603 (holding police officer may testify as expert that
defendant's packaging of cocaine indicated his intent to distribute).
88 See General Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 145 (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting
FED. R. EvID. 706 provides relief from proliferation of Daubert motions).
89

See supra note 69 (asserting that attorneys must rigorously interrogate experts

about qualifications and techniques).
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plaintiffs resulting from increased pretrial hearings is outweighed by the
benefits to jurors acting as fact finders in a particular case. Extending
Daubert to all expert testimony is an appropriate way to clarify issues before the jury, thereby ensuring that they will only hear testimony that is
helpful. 9°
Jason G. Duncan

90 This note is dedicated to my family, especially my wife Adrien, without whose

support I could not have finished this project.

